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ABSTRACT
This paper describes the relationship between shareholder’s political motive and corporate tax avoidance using the 
Fraud-Risk Theory framework. Many corporate shareholders around the world actively participated in their country’s 
political arena, either as politicians or as donors to political parties. In order to maintain their political activities, 
they need easy, cheap and large sources of funds. One of the possible sources of funds is the undisbursed income tax 
payment to the government. However, this predicament has aroused the suspicion of taxation authorities on the extent of 
shareholder’s corporate tax compliance. Since corporate tax avoidance and shareholder’s political motives are attached 
to two different entities (corporations and individuals), it is not possible to measure the direct relationship between the 
variables. However, in this case the relationship will be partially measured. The first part measures the relationship 
between corporate ownership and corporate tax avoidance, and the second part measures the relationship between 
shareholder’s political motive and his ownership in the corporation. Results from multivariate data analysis show that 
there are significant relationships between variables in both partial relationships. Therefore, this study concludes that 
shareholder’s political motive is negatively related to corporate tax compliance level, and shareholder’s political motive 
is considered as factor that has significant negative influence on corporate tax avoidance’s decision.
Keywords: Corporate tax avoidance; corporate tax compliance; shareholder’s political motive; book-tax differences; 
long-run cash effective tax rates; fraud-risk theory
INTRODUCTION
In the political area of research, Nassmacher (2003) 
reported that individuals who decide to participate in 
electoral campaign must consider three important trends: 
(1) Candidates must largely finance their own campaigns; 
(2) Political parties, generally, do not play a significant 
role in raising money for candidates; and (3) Businesses 
are reluctant to finance individual candidates. As such, the 
personal financial burden of this individual in this game of 
extreme risk is high. Interestingly, many wealthy corporate 
shareholders have their own reasons for participating in 
political arena as politicians or donors to political parties 
(will be referred to as political motivated shareholders for 
the rest of the paper) in every country around the world. As 
political motivated shareholders, their participation in the 
political arena requires a large amount of financial support in 
order to maintain the momentum of their (and their party’s) 
political activities. This situation raises a question about the 
source of the funds; as to whether it is derived from their 
own wealth, sponsorship, loan or money “borrowed” from 
the government in the form of taxes not disbursed. 
 According to Maslow (1943), an act typically has more 
than one motivation. Furthermore, Maslow also indicated 
that even when the psychological, safety, love and esteem 
needs have been satisfied, the need of self-actualization 
sometimes motivates an action to occur. In the research 
on the psychology of fraud, Cressey (1953) found that 
fraud generally shares three common traits: 1) embezzlers 
have the opportunity to perpetrate fraud, 2) the individual 
perceived a non-shareable financial need (pressure) and 
3) the individual involved in a fraud rationalized that 
the fraudulent act as being consistent with their personal 
code of ethics. Skousen and Wright (2006) used Crassey’s 
Fraud-Risk Theory to identify a set of contemporaneous 
firm-related factors that are empirically related to financial 
statement fraud. This theory provides the framework for 
identifying a firm’s fraud-risk factor and they contended 
that pressure, opportunity and rationalization are always 
present in varying degrees when financial statement 
fraud occurs. In discussing financial statements’ fraud 
and corporate tax avoidance activities, the common traits 
mentioned by Crassey (1953) will be found in each type 
of activity. Financial statements’ fraud and corporate tax 
avoidance activities are similar and comparable because 
there are: supply of motivated offenders, availability of 
suitable targets and absence of capable guardians (Krambia-
Kapardis 2001) in financial statements’ fraud and corporate 
tax avoidance. Thus, it becomes relevant when this study 
tries to investigate the relationship between shareholder’s 
political motive and corporate tax avoidance in the Fraud-
Risk Theory framework.
 Graham and Tucker (2006) and Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006) proposed that tax planning is a value-enhancing 
activity and found that shareholders hold to that belief. 
Scholes et al. (2009) pointed out that in addition to 
opportunity costs, there are other costs involved when 
using resources for tax management; i.e. transaction costs, 
implicit taxes and uncertainty. The bottom line is that, 
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corporations are willing to engage in tax planning if it 
is deemed as a value-enhancing activity and there is net 
benefit. The benefit of tax planning is clear; the avoiders 
will receive their economic benefit in terms of the amount 
of corporate income tax undisbursed to the government. 
Thus, the decision to pay corporate income tax depends 
on the willingness of each individual shareholder to pay 
taxes and what motivates such decision. In the research area 
of taxation, it seems that the fraud-risk theory has never 
been used in explaining on why a taxpayer commits tax 
avoidance. Emulating the success of by Skousen &Wright 
(2006) in using this theory at explaining why managers 
engage in fraudulent financial statements and how the 
auditors detect fraud in a corporation, this study utilized 
Cressey’s theory to identify and empirically examine a 
broad range of related factors that motivate corporate tax 
avoidance. 
 In testing the relationship between shareholder’s 
political motives and corporate tax avoidance, this study 
employed Book Tax Differences in the long run (Long-run 
BTDs) analysis and Cash Effective Tax Rates in the long run 
(Long-run CETRs) as corporate tax avoidance measures. 
The BTDs are derived from the differences between income 
reported to the capital market and income reported to the 
tax authorities. Manzon and Plesko (2002) and Desai (2003) 
used BTDs as an indirect approach to construct a measure 
of corporate tax avoidance. On the other hand, Dyreng, 
Hanlon and Maydew (2008) introduced another measure 
called Long-run CETRs based on the ability to pay a low 
amount of cash taxes per dollar of pre-tax earnings over 
long period. 
 Based on the results from multivariate data analysis 
within Indonesian setting, this study found that there 
are significant relationships between variables in both 
partial relationships. Therefore, this study concluded that 
shareholder’s political motive is negatively related to 
corporate tax compliance level, and shareholder’s political 
motive has significant negative influence on the corporate 
tax avoidance decision. Another finding from this study 
was that Fraud Risk Theory, usually used to explain fraud 
in psychology and accounting area of research, is applicable 
at explaining the relationship between tax avoidance and 
its related factors. This study contributes to the literature 
by identifying shareholder’s political motive as one of the 
factors that significantly affect corporate tax compliance 
decision in addition to the corporate ownership and 
corporate status discussed in the previous studies. The 
other contribution is that Fraud Risk Theory is useful at 
identifying factors that significantly influence corporate 
tax avoidance in tax research.
 The remaining of the paper will be structured as 
follows: Section 2 describes the literature review regarding 
corporate tax avoidance, how to identify it and what 
motivates tax avoidance; section 3 describes the literature 
review regarding Fraud-Risk Theory; Section 4 describes 
data collection and framework of the study; Section 5 
elaborates on the findings and discussions; and Section 6 
presents the conclusion.
CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE DEFINITION OF 
CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE
As far as the researchers are concerned, many definitions 
have been adduced to explain Tax Evasion and Tax 
Avoidance. GIZ (2010) defines tax evasion as the illegal 
practice of not paying taxes, not reporting income, 
reporting expenses that are not legally allowed, or not 
paying taxes owed. Simply put, tax evasion is a general 
term for the efforts of individuals, firms, trusts and 
other entities in evading the payment of taxes through 
illegal means; while tax avoidance is described as the 
legitimate effort of minimizing taxes by using methods 
approved by the authorities. Other researchers pointed 
out that tax avoidance is a highly subjective and covers a 
wide range of actions. As such, it is no longer sufficient 
to distinguish between avoidance (a legal action) and 
evasion (an illegal action). Amiram et al. (2012) defined 
corporate tax avoidance as any corporate activity, legal or 
illegal, designed to reduce corporate tax burden relative 
to the statutory rate. Dyreng et al. (2008; 2010) defined 
tax avoidance broadly as encompassing anything that 
reduces the firm’s taxes relative to its pre-tax accounting 
income. Dyreng et al. (2008) noted that the connotation 
of wrongdoing associates with the terms tax sheltering, 
tax evasion, and tax aggressiveness; and also considered 
the broad construct of tax avoidance. In the context of this 
research, the broad definition of tax avoidance is used as 
the basis of analysis and discussion. 
 The list for the practices of corporate tax avoidance is 
long, starting from the exploitation of tax laws’ loopholes 
to the exploitation of tax rates differentials between 
countries in order to reduce corporate tax burden. As 
stated in studies such as Braithwaite (2005); Desai, Foley 
& Hines (2006); Rego 2003; Slemrod (2001), corporate 
tax avoidance is entrenched within the corporate culture of 
many western economies. The act is about taking advantage 
of the gaps or loopholes in tax legislation to significantly 
reduce corporate taxes (Braithwaite 2005; Killaly 2009). 
Moreover, international tax avoidance arrangements might 
be structured and included in a firm’s overall commercial 
arrangement (Hamilton et al: 2001). Tax authorities around 
the world have recognized that international tax avoidance 
has been contributing to the progressive erosion of tax 
revenue as evidenced by the decline in corporate ETRs 
and the increase in the number of firms reporting a zero 
tax liability (ATO 2010). Taylor and Richardson (2012) 
mentioned that some of the main reasons attributed for 
reporting zero tax liabilities by firms are thin capitalization, 
abuse of transfer pricing rules and use of tax havens. 
IDENTIFYING CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE
Corporate financial statements are the results of corporate 
book and record keeping based on the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principle (GAAP). Financial statements are the 
media for the management in communicating the corporate 
financial performance to its shareholders. On the other 
hand, corporate financial statements are also used as the 
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basis to communicate the amount of taxable income and 
the amount of tax liability owed by the corporation for a 
specific tax period. The issue arises when the shareholders 
and the management (as the taxpayer) are reluctant to 
contribute part of the corporate income to the government; 
this is because income tax payments can decrease the 
portion meant to be distributed to its shareholders. The 
taxpayer can employ numerous methods in order to 
reduce the amount of tax liabilities such as reducing the 
total amount of reported income, increasing allowable 
deductions and practicing tax shelters within different tax 
jurisdictions (due to different tax rates). An important issue 
highlighted by emerging research is how to measure tax 
avoidance. Chen et al. (2010) employed four measures of 
tax avoidance: the GAAP ETR, the Cash ETR, total BTDs, 
and abnormal total BTDs. Taylor and Richardson (2012) 
used multiple measures of tax avoidance based on BTDs 
and long-run ETR to collect evidence on tax avoidance 
activities. Wilson (2009) mentioned that total BTDs, 
an indication of tax shelter participants, is one form of 
tax avoidance. Meanwhile, Frank et al. (2009) relied 
on permanent difference as proxies of tax shelter (tax 
aggressiveness). On the other hand, Rego and Wilson 
(2009) utilized three existing measures of tax avoidance, 
including discretionary BTDs, tax shelter prediction scores, 
and cash ETR at examining equity risk incentives as a 
determinant to corporate tax aggressiveness.
 It is important to note that each of those measures 
involving tax avoidance captures only non-conforming 
tax avoidance. Hanlon & Heitzman (2010) concluded 
that not all tax avoidance measures are appropriate for all 
research questions and that these measures depend on the 
availability of data. Corporations report taxable income on 
their tax returns, as well as report their income tax expenses 
and income tax assets and liabilities in their GAAP financial 
statements. Thus, estimates of taxable income and tax 
payments, which are important factors when measuring tax 
avoidance, could be obtained from either source. Most tax 
avoidance measures are obtained from financial statement 
data because tax returns are not publicly available and 
access is granted to only a few. 
 BTDs refer to the gap between the pre-tax income 
reported in a corporate financial statement and the taxable 
income reported to the tax authorities. The BTDs have been 
proposed as a measure of both earnings management and 
corporate tax avoidance (Graham, Raedy  & Shackelford 
2012). Corporations that are relatively successful at tax 
avoidance are likely, although not necessarily able, to 
sustain large differences between accounting income and 
taxable income (Alexander, Ettredge, Stone & Sun  2008; 
Dyreng et al. 2008; Frank et al. 2009; Rego & Wilson, 2009). 
Wilson (2009) found that BTDs are larger for corporations 
accused of engaging in tax shelters than for a matched 
sample of non-accused corporations. The evidence from 
these studies suggests that BTDs capture some elements 
of tax avoidance. Wilson (2009) indicated that BTDs are 
positively and significantly associated with incidences of 
tax sheltering activity. These results are consistent with 
BTDs of being a useful proxy for tax aggressiveness (Desai 
2003 and Mills 1996, 1998); but it is difficult to detect tax 
sheltering activity simply by examining corporate financial 
statements. Despite the complexity associated in examining 
BTDs, some researchers suggested that large positive BTDs 
are a signal of tax aggressiveness. Desai (2003) argued that 
the divergence between book and tax income during the 
1990’s was not attributable to traditional drivers of BTDs 
such as depreciation, but was actually caused by increased 
levels of tax sheltering. Heltzer (2006) found that BTDs 
provide insight into a firm’s relative level of tax reporting 
aggressiveness, but not a firm’s relative level of financial 
reporting aggressiveness.
The formula used to calculate the BTDs of each sample is:
BTDs it = Pre-Tax Income in Financial Statements it – 
  Taxable income in Tax Return it
 Even though large BTDs signal the possibility of tax 
avoidance, it must be remembered that BTDs do not only 
contain “illegal” differences but also contain “legal” 
differences allowed by tax provision and the subjects are 
considered as non-confirmed tax avoiders. Thus, in order 
to provide a comparison to the results of the BTDs analysis, 
the Long-run CETRs as proposed by Dyreng et al (2008) will 
be employed in this study. Long-run CETRs is calculated 
as the sum of cash tax paid over a period divided by the 
sum of pre-tax accounting income over the same period. 
Taylor and Richardson (2012) used long-run (four years) 
measures due to the potential for significant variation in 
annual ETR that might obscure indications of tax avoidance 
(Dyreng et al. 2008). 
 In their study, Dyreng et al. (2008) measured Long-run 
CETRs as the average of accounting tax expenses divided by 
pre-tax income over five- and ten-year periods to measure 
the average tax liability of the firm. The main advantage 
of the measure is the long-run nature of the computation, 
which avoids year-to-year volatility in annual effective tax 
rates. The utilization of long period allows the use of cash 
taxes paid in the numerator because the long-run measure 
avoids much of the mismatch in cash taxes and earnings. 
This type of analysis indicates the ability of corporations to 
pay low amount of taxes in the long run as reflected in the 
cash income tax paid divided by the amount of accounting 
pre-tax income. This shows that if tax liability is reduced, 
corporations will receive increased cash flow and an 
increase in after-tax net income. In addition, the amount 
of income tax paid as mentioned in the financial statement 
will be calculated for comparison. High Long-run CETRs 
(above average), that is closer to the statutory income tax 
rates, means that the corporation does not engage in any 
tax avoidance schemes. Conversely, low Long-run CETRs 
(below average) indicate that the corporation engages in 
tax avoidance. The formula for calculating Long-run CETRs 
proposed by Dyreng et al. (2008) is:
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 LRCETRit = 
SHAREHOLDER’S MOTIVE BEHIND 
CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE
Corporations are willing to engage in tax planning if it 
is deemed to be a value-enhancing activity. In previous 
researches, corporation will only engage in tax planning 
if there is net benefit, in other words, if the tax savings 
from planning outweigh the associated costs of executing 
the planning. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) found that 
tax avoidance is valued by shareholders. Meanwhile, 
Alm and Mc Clelland (2012) demonstrated a strong 
connection between the decisions that individuals make 
for themselves and the decisions individuals make 
through their corporations. Thus, the willingness to pay 
taxes at corporate level differs depending on each of the 
shareholders’ needs.
 Existing researches on corporate tax avoidance that 
linked to corporate shareholders’ motives are carried 
with focus on the economic benefit reason (motive) of 
tax avoidance. Ownership patterns can have an important 
effect on tax avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala 2008). 
Firms with concentrated ownership, such as the family 
firms examined in Chen et al. (2010), may avoid more 
taxes because controlling owners benefit more from the 
savings. McGuire, Wang, and Wilson (2011) found that 
firms with dual class stock ownership engage in less tax 
avoidance practices than other firms, consistent with 
managers who are insulated from takeovers avoid the costly 
effort associated with increased tax avoidance. Lastly, 
Badertscher, Katz and Rego (2011) provided the evidence 
that private equity firms significantly increase tax planning 
effectiveness of the firms in which they invest. This tax 
planning expertise persists even after private equity firm 
ownership is substantially reduced or terminated. Thus, 
different ownership structures have a significant impact 
on corporate tax practices.
 On the other hand, Van Biezen (2003) mentioned that 
the main traditional sources of internal party financing 
are membership fees, income from property, revenue 
from party activities such as the sale of newspapers or 
other party publications, fund raising activities, party 
festivals and other social events, and occasional public 
collections. These traditional modes of financing are no 
longer sufficient for parties which face the ever increasing 
expenses of political participation and competition. 
Donations continue to constitute a crucial source of income 
for parties. As the result, those who decide to participate in 
electoral politics in the surveyed countries must consider 
that candidates must largely finance their own campaigns 
(NDI 2005). The taxation practices in a corporation are very 
much dependent upon the person who has the main control 
and power in the corporation, which is reflected by the 
portion of ownership in the corporation. Furthermore, with 
an understanding that a corporation will behave like the 
individual who has control over the corporation and if the 
majority shareholder (as political motivated shareholder) 
expects financial need as well as having the knowledge 
to exploit the opportunity of tax avoidance through their 
corporations, then corporate tax avoidance will be the 
most possible option to the source of his financial need. 
Unfortunately, there is no specific research being done to 
address this particular issue of corporate tax avoidance.
FRAUD-RISK THEORY
Corporate fraud is a topic that has received significant 
and growing attention from regulators, auditors, and the 
public. External auditors have increasingly being asked to 
play an important role in helping organizations to prevent 
and detect fraud. Detecting fraud is not an easy task and 
requires thorough knowledge about the nature of fraud, why 
and how it is perpetrated, and how it is concealed. Cressey 
(1953) explained on why trust violators commit fraud and 
why it is widely used by regulators, professionals, and 
academicians. Three factors must be present for a person to 
violate trust, which are: non-shareable financial problems 
as a reflection of the pressure, opportunity to commit trust 
violations, and rationalization by the trust violator or also 
known as the fraud triangle, as shown in the Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1. Fraud Triangle
Source: Lister (2007)
 Pressure or motive to commit fraud, in the first corner 
of the fraud triangle, is the main factor of fraud. Lister 
(2007) described pressure or motive to commit fraud as 
“the source of heat for the fire” but he believed that the 
presence of the pressure in someone’s life does not mean 
he or she will commit fraud. Pressure or motive, which 
is non-sharable component in fraud, can be derived from 
many factors, such as financial or non-financial problems 
(Albrecht et al. 2008; 2010; Murdock 2008) emanating 
from an internal or external organization associated with 
personal or corporate pressure (Vona, 2008), political or 
social pressure (Murdock 2008) and also ego or power 
over people as well as over situation (Duffield & Grabosky 
2001). Lister (2007) also mentioned that there are three 
types of motivations or pressure: personal pressure to 
pay for a lifestyle, employment pressure from continuous 
compensation structures, or management’s financial 
interest; and external pressure such as threats to the 
businesses financial stability, financier’s covenants, and 
market expectations. Furthermore, Albrecht et al. (2008; 
2010) gave some examples of perceived financial pressure 
that can motivate fraud, such as personal financial losses, 
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falling sales, inability to compete with other companies, 
greed, living beyond one’s means, personal debt, poor 
credit, the need to meet short term credit crises, inability 
to meet financial forecasts, and unexpected financial 
needs. Meanwhile, examples of non-financial pressure 
are the need to report results that are better than actual 
performance, frustration with work, or even as challenge 
to beat the system.
 In the second corner of fraud triangle, Lister (2007) 
expressed opportunity as “the fuel that keeps the fire going” 
and he believed that even if a person has a motive, the 
person could not perpetrate a fraud without being given an 
opportunity. Vona (2008) believed that a person’s position 
in the organization contributes to the opportunity to commit 
fraud. He also believed that there is a direct correlation 
between opportunity to commit fraud and the ability 
to conceal the fraud. However, Rae and Subramaniam 
(2008) suggested that opportunity refers to weakness in 
the system where the employee has the power or ability 
to exploit, whereby making fraud possible. Lister (2007) 
gave some examples of opportunities that can lead to 
fraud such as high turnover of management in key roles, 
lack of segregation of duties, and complex transactions or 
organizational structures. As for perceived opportunities 
to commit fraud, the examples include a weak board 
of directors, a lack of or circumvention of control that 
prevents or detects fraudulent behavior, failure to discipline 
perpetrators of fraud, lack of access to information, and 
lack of audit trail (Albrecht et al. 2008; 2010).
 As for the third component of the fraud triangle, which 
is rationalization, Lister (2007) defined it as “the oxygen 
that keeps the fire burning”. Rae and Subramaniam (2008) 
argued that rationalization is the justification of fraudulent 
behavior emanating from an employee’s lack of personal 
integrity, or other moral reasoning. Albrecht et al. (2008; 
2010) mentioned some examples of rationalization that 
executives use to commit fraud, such as; “we need to 
keep the stock price high”, “all companies use aggressive 
accounting practices”, or “it is for the good of the 
company”. Meanwhile, Duffield and Grabosky (2001) 
stated that rationalization is a process of reducing the 
offender’s inhibitions. Regardless of the type of fraud, 
most offenders seem to seek vindication or rationalization 
to their activities.
DATA COLECTION AND FRAMEWORK
THE DATA
This study was conducted as a pilot project for a wider 
study intended to explain the relationship between 
shareholder’s political motive and corporate tax avoidance 
in an Indonesian setting. In order to test the relationship 
among variables, this study needs a specific type of 
corporate micro data such as accounting data and tax data 
related to corporations owned by shareholders involved 
in political arena. Before the collection of the financial 
and tax data, the selection of appropriate corporation as 
study sample is very important. For the purpose of defining 
shareholder’s political motives, this study will justify 
the status of the ultimate individual shareholder of the 
corporation as the measure of shareholder’s involvement in 
political arena. When the status of corporate shareholder is 
a politician or related to a political party, this study deemed 
this shareholder as having political motive. Data from 
the National General Election Commission and political 
parties’ official websites are also important in assessing the 
individual shareholder’s status. Unfortunately, the direct 
shareholders of a public company are also companies. 
Thus, through the multi-layered corporate ownership 
examination, we tracked down the owner as to identify 
the ultimate corporate shareholder. 
 This study did not employ proportional samples 
methodology in selecting qualified samples. Rather, 
this study selected its samples based on the sequence 
when a corporation is identified as a sample. First, the 
shareholders were categorized into political motivated 
and non-political motivated shareholders; this study put 
two political parties’ members into one group and three 
non-political parties’ members into other group. After 
tracking down the multi-layered ownership (starting with 
12 listed companies), this study tracked down another 20 
private companies that are directly and indirectly owned 
by the five shareholders. After the samples were selected, 
accounting and tax data that are important at explaining the 
relationships were collected. The data include information 
such as: 1) portion of share owned by specified subjects, 
2) elements of the corporate financial statements, and (3) 
elements of corporate tax returns. Portion of shares will be 
used as indicators of the shareholders’ power in controlling 
the corporation. Corporate financial statements and 
corporate tax return data are very important in assessing 
corporate tax compliance level. Corporate financial data 
are extracted from corporate financial statements, while tax 
return data are obtained from the Indonesian Tax Authority. 
However, due to data confidentiality, data regarding the 
taxpayer’s identity will not be disclosed. Furthermore, 
quantitative financial statements and tax return data will be 
transferred into proportional fractions. The period of data 
quantification is 10 years, i.e. from 2002 until 2001. This 
is due to the need to identify the practice of corporate tax 
avoidance and minimize the issue of temporary variations 
in BTDs in the long run. 
IDENTIFYING CTA RELATED FACTORS BASED 
ON THE FRAUD TRIANGLE
In the research of fraud in financial statements, a growing 
body of empirical evidence indicates that there is a 
relationship between various corporate governance-related 
issues and incidence of financial statement fraud. For 
example, fraud has been linked to concentration of power 
(Dunn 2004), CEOs serving on boards of directors (Dechow 
et al. 1996), audit committee independence (Abbott et 
al. 2000), board of director composition (Beasley 1996), 
32 
and the existence of audit committees (Beasley 1996). 
Fraud is also linked to financial-related factors, such as 
sales growth and leverage (Beneish 1997), inventory and 
return on assets (Summers and Sweeney 1998), and the 
desire to obtain low-cost financing (Dechow, et al. 1996). 
While extant research identifies a number of factors related 
to fraud in various settings, Skousen and Wright (2006) 
could not find any study that identifies a set of risk factors 
linked to financial statement fraud. Additionally, they 
also examined an array of potential fraud risk factors in 
order to identify a comprehensive set of coexistent factors 
that are consistently linked to the incidence of financial 
statement fraud. Using the examples cited in SAS No. 99 
and employing Cressey’s (1953) fraud risk theory, they 
developed fraud proxy variables representing various 
measures of pressure, opportunity and rationalization and 
tested these variables using a sample of fraud-firms and 
a matched sample of no-fraud firms. This analysis yields 
a number of significant factors related to pressure and 
opportunity. These results indicate that (1) the proportion 
of independent audit committee members is inversely 
related to the incidence of fraud; (2) when the proportion of 
ownership held by managers holding more than 5 percent 
of the outstanding shares increases, the probability of fraud 
increases; (3) when the proportion of insider ownership 
(management and directors) decreases, the probability 
of fraud increases; (4) the frequency of fraud is higher 
among firms that do not have an audit committee; and (5) 
when one individual holds both the CEO and Chairman of 
the Board positions, the incidence of fraud is significantly 
higher than when the two positions are held by different 
individuals.
shareable. The pressure on the management to undertake 
aggressive tax reporting can be triggered by financial strain 
faced by the corporation’s shareholders as to satisfy their 
political activities. Cornett et al. (2007) mentioned that 
institutional investors are becoming increasingly willing 
to use their ownership rights to pressure managers to act 
in the best interest of the shareholders. Recent accounting 
research investigated the link between ownership structures 
and corporate tax avoidance. It is found that ownership 
patterns can have an important effect on tax avoidance 
(Desai and Dharmapala 2008). Meanwhile, firms with 
concentrated ownership, such as the family firms, as 
examined in Chen et al. (2010), may avoid more taxes 
because controlling owners benefit from the savings. 
Additionally, McGuire, Wang and Wilson (2011) found 
that firms with dual class stock ownership engage in 
lesser tax avoidance practice than other firms, consistent 
with managers that are insulated from takeovers; avoiding 
the costly effort associated with increased tax avoidance. 
Lastly, Badertscher, Katz and Rego (2011) provided the 
evidence that private equity firms significantly increase 
the tax planning effectiveness of the firms in which they 
invest. 
 According to Cressey’s fraud triangle model, the 
presence of a non-shareable financial problem (pressure) 
itself, will not lead to the act of fraud. Meanwhile, Lou & 
Wang (2009) mentioned that opportunities are results of 
firm’s circumstance; whereby it provides the chance to 
commit fraud. Status of a corporation, besides loopholes 
in the tax laws and regulations, provide the chance for 
corporate tax avoidance. Aside from Chen and Chu 
(2002), all of the preceding literature assumed that the 
firm owner, or residual claimant, makes tax reporting 
decision with no agency consideration. This assumption 
makes sense when one is analyzing small, closely-held 
businesses. However, in a large, publicly-held corporation, 
decisions about taxes (and accounting) are not made by 
the shareholders directly, rather, by their agents, i.e. the 
chief financial officer or the vice president for taxation. In 
order to align the incentives of the decision makers and the 
shareholders, the corporation has the incentive to tie the 
agent’s compensation to observable outcomes that affect 
after-tax corporation profitability.
 Rationalization of tax avoidance is not the main 
factor of corporate tax avoidance but this factor provides 
an additional motivation. Rarely being audited and being 
imposed of severe tax penalties are examples of the 
justification to tax avoidance. Cressey (1953) believed that 
most fraudsters see themselves as ordinary, honest people 
who are caught in a bad situation; thus, enabling them to 
justify that their act of fraud is acceptable or justifiable. 
Furthermore, he pointed out that rationalization is a part 
of motivation of the fraud. In their research, Skousen and 
Wright (2006) mentioned that rationalization is a necessary 
component to the fraud triangle, and an individual’s 
rationale is difficult to observe. Extant researches 
indicated that frequent audit failure and litigation increases 
immediately after a change in auditor.
FIGURE 2. CTA Triangle
Source: Lister (2007) - elaborated
 This study used the basic premise that tax avoidance 
is a function of pressure received by the corporation or 
its management, opportunity presented to the corporation 
and rationalization of corporate tax avoidance. As such, 
the basic understanding of corporate tax avoidance as 
represented on the tax avoidance triangle as shown on 
Figure-2 can be expressed according to the function bellow: 
 CTA = f (Pressure, Opportunity, Rationalization)
 At corporate level, pressure for corporate tax avoidance 
is as a result of perceived pressure of the corporation, by 
an entity or a person who rules the corporation, such as the 
management and the shareholders. In this study, pressure 
will be determined based on financial strain that is non-
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VARIABLES DEFINITION, MEASURES AND THE MODEL
This paper focused on three types of independent variables. 
Meanwhile, the dependent variable is Corporate Tax 
Avoidance (CTA); representing corporate tax compliance 
level. CTA will be defined into two score classifications: 
‘0’ for relatively comply-condition and ‘1’ for suspected 
non-comply condition. In justifying taxpayer compliance 
levels, this study relies on the common tax avoidance 
measures, i.e. Long-run BTDs and Long-run Cash ETR. For 
Indonesia, effective 2002, its average corporate income 
tax rate for a 10-year period is around 28% for non-public 
corporations and 27% for public corporations. This study 
assumed a 20% income tax rate on accounting pre-tax 
income as the moderate effective tax rate to justify corporate 
tax compliance level. Consequently, the allowed BTDs are 
in line with the 20% moderate income tax rate (which is 
around 30% on accounting based earnings). A corporation 
is justified as a relatively complying corporation if it holds 
a relatively small BTDs (less than 30% differences) during 
the period of ten years and holds a relatively high amount 
of income tax paid compared to the pre-tax income (more 
than 20% on its accounting earning). On the contrary, when 
a corporation holds Long-run CETRs that are less than 20% 
on its accounting earnings and the book-tax differential ratio 
is more than 30%, this corporation is justified as a suspected 
non-complying corporation.
 In order to analyze the effect of shareholder’s political 
motive in the decision of corporate tax avoidance, this study 
included shareholder’s political motive (SHPOLMOT) variable 
as an independent variable into the model. SHPOLMOT 
reflects the shareholders’ political activities as politician or 
donor that possibly provide the pressure to the corporation 
in deciding to undertake tax avoidance activity for economic 
benefit goal. For analysis purpose, SHPOLMOT variable 
will be determined by two score classifications. Score ‘1’ 
denotes shareholders that are actively engaged in the political 
activities, and score ‘0’ for otherwise. 
 As the factor that possibly provides the pressure for 
corporate tax avoidance decision, SHPOLMOT by its own 
cannot directly influence this decision. This motive of 
shareholders needs a vehicle as to be effective in pressuring 
the corporation, i.e. through ownership structure. As Desai 
& Dharmapala (2008) concluded that ownership pattern can 
have an important effect on tax avoidance, this study adopted 
corporate ownership (CO_OWNERSHIP) as another 
independent variable in the model. CO_OWNERSHIP 
reflects on control and power of the shareholders and will be 
classified into two score classifications: ‘1’ for corporations 
where majority of their shares (> 50%) are owned by a 
specific shareholder, and ‘0’ for corporations with minority 
shares (less than 50%), owned by a specific shareholder; 
except for public corporations where public shareholders 
can only hold corporate shares of not more than 5% (in the 
form of corporate common stocks). 
 Status of a corporation is believed to be a factor that 
provides the opportunity for corporate tax avoidance activity. 
With more control and power residing in the corporation, 
it is easier for the majority shareholders to drive the 
corporation to the direction they desire. McGuire, Wang 
and Wilson (2010) found that firms with dual-class stock 
ownership engaged in lesser tax avoidance activity as 
compared to other firms; rendering public corporations to 
be more open to third-party access and less tax avoidance 
rather than non-public corporations. In this study, the 
independent variable for opportunity factor of corporate 
tax avoidance is corporate status (CO_STATUS), which 
is determined by two score classifications, ‘1’ for a public 
company and ‘0’ for a non-public company. 
 Even though it is a necessary component to the fraud 
triangle, this pilot project study did not include variable for 
rationalization into the model. This is because corporate 
shareholder’s perception on corporate tax avoidance in this 
context is difficult to observe. Thus, the model of corporate 
tax avoidance is expressed on the equation as follow:
CTA = α0 + α1 CO_OWNERSHIP + α2 CO_STATUS 
  + α3 SHPOLMOT + e
 With the understanding that ownership patterns 
can have an important effect on tax avoidance (Desai & 
Dharmapala 2009); firms with concentrated ownership 
might avoid more taxes because controlling owners 
benefit more from the savings (Chen et al. 2010); and 
the relationship between shareholder political motive 
(SHPOLMOT) and corporate tax avoidance (CTA) constitutes 
an indirect relationship, we built another model in order to 
explain the relationship, the equation is as follows: 
 CO_OWNERSHIP = ϙ0 + ϙ1 SHPOLMOT + e 
STAGE OF ANALYSIS
Stage 1 – Descriptive Statistics   This study examined 
the relationship between corporate tax avoidance with 
shareholder’s political motive that creates pressure on 
corporate tax avoidance. The descriptive statistics for the 
variables of 32 samples are as shown on Table 1 below. 
For the CTA variable, the mean CTA level of the samples 
is at 0.625 (in the range level of 0 for non suspected CTA 
to 1 for suspected CTA). It means that the level of CTA 
of the samples varied and do not concentrate at single 
justification. From the mean value of corporate status, it 
can be seen that 37.5% of the sampled corporations are 
private corporations; and from the mean value of corporate 
ownership it shows that 81.25% of the samples are directly 
and indirectly owned by majority shareholders. Meanwhile 
65.6% of the sampled corporations are owned by political 
motivated shareholders, regardless of the level of their 
ownerships. Based on the condition of the samples, we 
concluded that the samples are representative in explaining 
the relationship in this pilot project study.
Stage 2 - Relationship Test    In order to test the relationship 
among the variables, the multivariate statistical analysis 
was employed. After filtering the samples into groups of 
companies based on the ownership, multiple regressions 
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were used to test the relationship between the dependent 
variable (CTA) and independent variables (CTA related 
factors).
FINDINGS
This study started with the analysis on the relationship 
between CTA and its related factors at corporate level. 
Results from regression analysis of the equation with 
CTA as dependent variable with CO_STATUS and 
CO_OWNSHIP as the dependent variables indicate that 
corporate status (CO_STATUS) and corporate ownership 
(CO_OWNERSHIP) do not significantly impact corporate 
tax avoidance (CTA) at 0.05 level. However, when this 
study included the variable, shareholder political motive 
(SHPOLMOT), into the model, the coefficient of corporate 
ownership and also its significance level changed. As 
shown in the Table 2, the regression results indicate 
that corporate ownership (CO_OWNERSHIP) gives a 
significant negative effect (coefficient -0.710) on corporate 
tax avoidance (CTA) at 0.021 level.
 Looking at the regression analysis on equation with 
CO_OWNERSIP as dependent variable and SHPOLMOT as 
the independent variable as shown on Table 3, the results 
indicates that shareholder’s political motive (SHPOLMOT) 
significantly and positively influences corporation’s 
ownership structure (CO_OWNERSHIP) at 0.000 level 
and the coefficient for independent variable (SHPOLMOT) 
is at 0.545.
 Based on the regression results above, this study 
concluded that there is a significant negative indirect 
correlation between shareholder’s political motive 
(SHPOLMOT) and corporate tax avoidance (CTA) through 
corporate ownership. Results from this study also 
supported the findings of Desai and Dharmapala (2008) 
where ownership patterns can have an important effect on 
tax avoidance; and also the finding of Chen et al. (2010) 
where concentrated ownership, such as the family firms, 
may avoid more taxes due to savings’ benefits.
 On the other hand, this study concluded that the 
relationship between corporate status (CO_STATUS) and 
corporate tax avoidance (CTA) is not significant at 0.05 
level even though the significance level moved down from 
0.578 to 0.168 after the inclusion of SHPOLMOT variable. As 
the result, this study is still unable to confirm the research 
findings from the study of McGuire, Wang, and Wilson 
(2011) where firms with dual class stock ownership engage 
in lesser tax avoidance practices than other firms; and also 
from Badertscher, Katz and Rego (2011) who posited that 
private equity firms significantly increase the effectiveness 
of tax planning of firms they invest. 
CONCLUSION
This study tries to examine the relationship between 
shareholder’s political motive (SHPOLMOT) and corporate 
tax compliance level (CTA) through the Fraud-Risk 
Theory framework. Result from the analysis shows that 
there is a negative indirect relationship between these 
two variables. Thus, it can be inferred from the results 
that there is a positive significant relationship between 
shareholder’s political motive (SHPOLMOT) and corporate 
ownership (CO_OWNERSHIP); and corporate ownership 
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistic
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance
CTA
CO_STATUS
CO_OWNERSHIP
SHPOLMOT
32
32
32
32
.00
.00
.00
.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
.6250
.3750
.8125
.6563
.49187
.49187
.39656
.48256
.242
.242
.157
.233
TABLE 2. Regression Result (dependent variable CTA)
Independent Variable COEFFECIENT T Sig.
(Constant)
CO_STATUS
CO_OWNERSHIP
SHPOLMOT
.780
.329
-.710
.454
3.205
1.415
-2.456
1.495
.003**
.168
.021*
.146
Model fit:
 R
 R Square
 Adjusted R Square
 Std. Error
 F Statistic
.459
.211
.126
.45979
2.492 
*. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).   
**. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
  35
(CO_OWNERSHIP) has significant negative relationship 
with corporate compliance level (CTA). Also, it can be 
said that shareholder’s political motive is a factor that 
significantly influences a corporation’s tax avoidance 
decision. Findings on the relationship between corporate 
tax avoidance and corporate ownership are in line with 
the findings of Desai and Dharmapala (2009) and Chen 
et al. (2010). The findings on the relationship between 
shareholder’s motive and corporate tax avoidance is a 
new understanding in tax compliance research and will 
add a new corpus of knowledge. Furthermore, the findings 
also gave an understanding that the Fraud-Risk Theory 
is applicable at explaining taxpayer behavior in this tax 
compliance research. 
 This study is conducted as a pilot project study that 
captures only 32 corporations as samples. Additionally, 
this research only covered three independent variables, 
and ignored other unexplained variables. As a result, the 
findings can yet be generalized and further research is still 
open as to explore the issues in the relationship between 
corporate tax avoidance and its related factors based on 
Fraud Risk Theory framework. 
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